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Abstract. The majority game, modelling a system of heterogeneous agents
trying to behave in a similar way, is introduced and studied using methods of
statistical mechanics. The stationary states of the game are given by the (local)
minima of a particular Hopfield like hamiltonian. On the basis of a replica
symmetric calculations, we draw the phase diagram, which contains the analog of
a retrieval phase. The number of metastable states is estimated using the annealed
approximation. The results are confronted with extensive numerical simulations.
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1. Introduction
The cooperative processes taking place in complex systems of agents interacting with
each other, which were up to quite recently studied mainly by human sciences, became
also an interesting object of research for physicists. Despite the tremendous complexity
of such systems and the presence of the unpredictable ingredients related to human free
will, some of the statistical regularities which characterise their collective behaviour
can be studied using models and techniques developed in the field of statistical physics.
As usually in such situations one builds very abstract theoretical models which
have a much wider applicability. The so called minority game, for example, was
proposed as a formalisation of the El-Farol bar problem [1], in order to capture the
essential features of traders’ interaction in a stock exchange market [2]. But the
same model can describe a more general situation where many agents compete for the
exploitation of a number of scarce resources [3].
This seemingly simple model turns out to exhibit a surprisingly rich variety of
complex behaviours which were studied thoroughly using various methods [4, 5, 6].
The statistical mechanics approach to this sort of models is particularly interesting as
it reveals aspects of cooperative phenomena which may be qualitatively different from
those studied in physics.
The minority game is based on the assumption that agents prefer to avoid crowds.
Hence they tend to use those strategies which let them be as often as possible in the
minority. This is only one of many possible types of interactions. It seems natural to
ask what happens under the reversed (majority) rule, favouring those strategies which
allow the agents to stay on the side of the majority.
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In the economic interpretation of this sort of models, it has been shown [7]
that the minority rule describes so-called “fundamental” or “contrarian” traders in
a financial market. These are agents who believe that market prices are close to an
equilibrium and hence expect that price fluctuations tend to generate price changes
towards the equilibrium value. The majority rule is instead appropriate for trend
followers, whose behaviour is thought to be responsible for the so called “bubbles” –
buy rushes leading to price increases well beyond those which would be justified by
an economic evaluation. The majority mechanism is self-reinforcing as it generates
self-fulfilling prophecies: if the agents expect that the price will rise (fall), the majority
of them will buy (sell) which will actually make the price rise (fall).
Before focusing on the majority game, let us mention that the competition
between majority and minority players has been studied in Ref. [7] in the simplest
setting and in Ref. [8] in its full complexity.
From a wider perspective, the majority game describes a situation where the profit
of agents increases with the number of agents acting in the same way. Conformity
effects of this type are evident in the spreading of fashions. A further example may be
that of a shop which lowers the prices as the number of customers increases, or of a
product which becomes cheaper the more it is popular. This mechanism, which goes
under the name of increasing returns in economics, lies at the heart of quite interesting
aggregation phenomena – for example the emergence of cities and economic districts
such as Silicon Valley and Hollywood [9].
As we shall see the study of majority game leads to the analysis of models which
are very similar to attractor neural networks, in particular to the Hopfield model
[10]. In brief, agents’ learning dynamics is different from Glauber dynamics, but the
energy landscape where it takes place is the same. It turns out that aggregation in the
majority game is the same phenomenon as memory retrieval in the Hopfield model.
Hence the physics of neural networks tells us a lot about the behaviour of the majority
game. On the other hand, this study also provides new results on the physics of neural
networks by probing the energy landscapes such as that of the Hopfield model with a
different type of dynamics.
Our work is based on a statistical mechanics approach to the stationary states of
the majority game and its results are verified by numerical simulations. The paper
is organised as follows: In the next section we introduce the model and in section 3
we discuss its stationary states – we show that they can be identified with the local
minima of the Hopfield type hamiltonian. Section 4 deals with the calculation of free
energy and the construction of the phase diagram. Given that stationary states are
selected in a dynamical way and not according to a Boltzmann weight, we compare
our results with extensive numerical simulations. In order to clarify the dynamical
behaviour of the model, we discuss the number of stationary states in section 5. We
conclude with a summary of the main results and a discussion of their implications.
2. The definition of the model
We consider a system consisting of N agents interacting at discrete time intervals (at
each round of the game). The interaction takes place through the action, concerning p
objects or resources, which each agent undertakes. The actions are determined by one
of r strategies which are chosen randomly and independently for each of the agents
at the beginning of the game. In the course of the game the agents can change their
actions only by changing their strategies, i.e. choosing one of the r predefined ones
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(for each agent). We denote by aµis the action taken by agent i = 1, . . . , N concerning
resource µ = 1, . . . , p when he/she adopts strategy s = 1, . . . , r. We consider here the
case of binary actions aµis = ±1. The specific values of aµis – the realisation of quenched
disorder – are drawn at random from some distribution. Thus a strategy is a binary
vector, which can be interpreted for instance as a list of actions to be undertaken
concerning each of the objects.
Agent i chooses the strategy used in the next round of the game on the basis of
the performances of his/her strategies in the previous runs, which are measured by a
score functions uis(t). The agents choose the strategy
si(t) = argmax
s
uis(t) (1)
with the highest score and undertake the profile of actions aµisi(t) µ = 1, ..., p (i =
1, ..., N). The agents know about the actions of others only through the cumulative
actions:
Aµ(t) =
N∑
i=1
aµisi(t) , µ = 1, . . . , p (2)
which are used to update the score functions:
uis(t+ 1) = uis(t) +
ǫ
p
p∑
µ=1
aµis
[
Aµ(t)− η(aµisi(t) − a
µ
is)
]
, (3)
where ǫ > 0 and η ∈ [0, 1] are constants.
Let us first discuss this dynamics for η = 0. Note that Aµ(t) has the same sign as
the action undertaken by the majority concerning object µ. Then eq. (3) implies that
those strategies prescribing an action aligned with the majority are rewarded. In other
words, by this learning dynamics, agents strive to find that strategy which puts them
in the majority. Because of the averaging over µ this rule is called a batch version
of the majority game. The on-line version, where a value µ(t) is randomly drawn at
each time and agents update the scores depending on Aµ(t)(t), will be discussed in the
concluding section.
With parameter 0 < η < 1 one can change the degree to which the agents take
into account the influence of their own actions on the cumulative quantity Aµ(t) (see
[11]). In particular the case η = 1 describes agents who are learning to respond
optimally to the behaviour of the others. Indeed for η = 1 eq. (3) computes the
correct value of Aµ(t) if agent i had actually played strategy s. This is what game
theory assumes a rational player should do, so the stationary states of the game for
η = 1 are Nash equilibria (i.e. those states where each agent takes the optimal strategy,
given the strategy of others [12]). Like in the Minority game [4], in spite of the fact
that Aµ(t) ∼ √N is much larger than aµis ∼ O(1), the η term is not negligible.
The new, updated payoff functions are used to determine the action in the next
time step through eq. (1).
Note that Aµ(t) is the difference between the size of the two groups of agents
who undertake opposite actions aµisi = +1 or −1. If agents do not interact and the
actions +1 and −1 are equivalent, it is obvious that Aµ(t) ∼ √N . We shall pay special
attention, in what follows, to the possibility that, when turning on the interaction, a
macroscopic difference Aµ(t) ∝ N may emerge, for some value of µ.
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2.1. r = 2 case
In this paper we will focus on the case where r = 2. We allow for a correlation of the
two strategies of the same agent by introducing a parameter
g = P (aµi+ = a
µ
i−) , (4)
with P (aµi+ = 1) = P (a
µ
i+ = −1) = 12 .
Instead of keeping track of the two payoff functions it is enough to consider their
difference:
yi =
ui+ − ui−
2
(5)
3. Stationary states
Taking the average over the stationary state distribution, which we denote by 〈...〉, of
the dynamical equation of yi(t), we get:
vi ≡ 〈yi(t+ 1)− yi(t)〉
ǫ
= ξiΩ+
N∑
j=1
ξiξjmj − ηξ2imi , (6)
where we used a standard notation:
mi = 〈sign yi〉, ξµi =
aµi+ − aµi−
2
, Ωµ =
N∑
j=1
aµi+ + a
µ
i−
2
, x =
1
p
p∑
µ=1
xµ
We expect that all the agents in the long time limit are frozen, i.e. they do not
change their strategies. Indeed, exactly as in the case of the minority game, it is easy
to check that the stationary states correspond to the minima of
Hη = − 1
2
A2 +
η
2
∑
i
ξ2im
2
i
= − 1
2
∑
i,j
ξiξjmimj −
∑
i
Ωξimi − 1
2
(Ωµ)
2
+
η
2
∑
i
ξ2im
2
i . (7)
The argument starts by observing that if vi 6= 0, then yi → ±∞, depending on the
sign of vi, and hence mi = sign vi. Only if vi = 0 we can have mi 6= ±1. Then one
observes that vi = −∂Hη∂mi so these conditions are equivalent to the conditions for the
minima of Hη. But it is evident, from the form of Hη, that its minima lie only at the
corners of the hypercube [−1, 1]N .
The conclusion that stationary states correspond to the minima of Hη is
straightforward from the dynamical equations in the limit ǫ → 0. Then one can
introduce a rescaled continuous time τ = ǫt and verify that Hη is a Lyapunov function
of the continuum time dynamics.
Fig. 1 shows that numerical simulations fully confirm the above picture. Note in
particular that while the initial stages of the dynamics are somewhat noisy, fluctuations
are negligible in the long time limit.
Strictly speaking there is no stationary state in terms of the variables yi as they
diverge to ±∞. The term stationary state refers to the variables mi which take well
defined values in the limit t→∞.
We remark that the H0 is simply related to the predictability H = −2H0
introduced in the minority game [6]. Since mi = ±1 for all i, H is also equal to
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the volatility σ2 = A2. Hence agents in the majority game strive to maximise H
whereas agents in the minority game minimise it.
Hη is very similar to the Hamiltonian of the Hopfield model known from the
theory of neural networks [13]. The only differences are: the scaling with 1/p instead
of 1/N , the presence of the random field and the fact that the patterns ξµi can take
three values 0,±1 instead of only two ±1. By analogy with physics we shall call Hη
energy. We notice that for g = 0 one obtains the “pure” Hopfield model (with different
rescaling), whereas for g = 1/2 one has a majority game with independently chosen
strategies.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
# of time steps
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
Energy
−20
0
200
400
600
800
# of agents that change the strategy
Figure 1. Simulations of the model for α = 0.2, N = 1000, η = 0 and random
initial conditions.
The stationary state values of mi satisfy the equations:
mi = sgn

ξiΩ+ N∑
j=1
ξiξjmj − ηξ2imi

 (8)
It is clear that any configuration C = {mi} which is a solution of these equations for
some value of η ∈ [0, 1] will also be a solution for all η′ < η. Hence the set Sη of
stationary states satisfies the property Sη ⊂ Sη′ for η′ < η and, in particular, S1 ⊂ Sη
for all η < 1. It is also easy to see that the state with minimal value of Hη lies in S1
for all η ∈ [0, 1]. This shows that Nash equilibria are stationary state of the majority
game for all values of η, but the converse is not true.
In the remaining part of this article we will try to determine the nature of the
stationary states of the majority game and calculate the number of such states. In the
next section we will employ the replica method to analyse the thermodynamics (for
T = 0) of the model defined by the Hamiltonian (7). Then, using the stability relation
(8) we will calculate the number of stationary states in the annealed approximation
as a function of various parameters .
4. Replica approach to thermodynamics
In the light of the previous considerations, it is clear that stationary states of the
majority game for all values of η ∈ [0, 1] are determined by the minima of Hη lying
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at the corners of the hypercube [−1, 1]N . Note that when we restrict ourselves to
mi = ±1 the η term in Hη becomes an irrelevant constant. This is why all the results
in this section do not depend on η.
As usual, we build a partition function corresponding to the Hamiltonian (7),
introducing an inverse temperature β. Using the replica method [14], we perform the
average over quenched disorder and obtain the free energy density function. Within the
replica symmetric ansatz, the latter depends on the Edward Anderson order parameter
q, the overlap b with pattern ξ1 and the residual overlap r. In the limit β → ∞ we
find q → 1 with
χ = lim
β→∞
β(1 − q)
finite and the free energy takes the form:
f =
1
2
b2
α
+ αχr − α
2
1
α− (1− g)χ − 2
√
αr
π
[
g + (1− g)e−b2/(4α3r)
]
− (1− g)b
α
erf
(
b
2α3/2
√
r
)
. (9)
The parameters b, r and χ should take the values optimising the free energy. We
remark that the overlap b corresponds to the equilibrium value of A1/N . The capacity
α = p/N , the reversed temperature β and g defined by (4) are the parameters.
The analysis of the solutions to the saddle point equations
∂f
∂b
= 0 ,
∂f
∂r
= 0 ,
∂f
∂χ
= 0 (10)
allows us to draw the phase diagram (see fig. 2).
One can distinguish two phases: a spin glass phase (b = 0) and a retrieval phase,
where besides a spin glass solution there exists also a retrieval solution (b 6= 0).
A simple calculation shows that for the spin glass solution
A2
N
=
−2H0
N
∼=
(
1 +
√
2(1− g)
πα
)2
within the replica symmetric ansatz (see Fig. 3). The solution with b 6= 0, which
using the neural network nomenclature, we call retrieval, is conveniently described in
terms of the parameter x = b/(2α
√
αr) [15], which satisfies the equation
x =
(1− g)erf(x)√
2α(1− g) + 2π−1/2(1− g)[g + (1− g)e−x2 ] . (11)
For g ≤ 2/3, two non-zero solutions for x(α) exist up to a critical value αc(g), but
only one of them represents a thermodynamically stable state. Of course for g → 0
we find that the spin glass and retrieval solutions of (10) converge to the solutions
found for the Hopfield model [15]. The phase separation line αc(g) in fig. (2) smoothly
approaches the α = 0 axis αc ≃ 752pi
(
2
3 − g
)4
when g → 2/3.
In the retrieval phase the dynamics can, depending on the initial conditions, end
up in one of the two qualitatively different sorts of attractors. In the majority game
language the retrieval corresponds to the macroscopic value of Aµ ∼ O(N) for some
µ (say 1), whereas Aµ ∼ √N for the remaining values of µ = 2, ..., p. In the spin glass
phase, Aµ ∼ √N for all µ.
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0.8
g
0 0.05 0.1
α
0.3
0.5
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1 >
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g=0.15
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p=256
Figure 2. The phase diagram computed by the replica symmetric approach
described in the text (full line). The points are numerical estimate of the phase
boundary αc(g) obtained from the crossing of the maximal overlap for different
system sizes, as shown in the inset (g = 0.15, η = 1, p = 64, 128 and 256, maximal
overlap initial conditions).
To confirm these analytical results we have performed extensive numerical
simulations using the dynamical definition of the model (1, 3). This is important
because the above calculation is based on the Boltzmann weight and it focuses on
the lowest energy minima. There is, however, no guarantee that the dynamics of the
majority game selects the minima with the lowest energy.
Direct iteration of the dynamics is slow because in the late stages the time interval
between individual spin flips si → −si becomes very large. A much more efficient
algorithm is possible in the continuum dynamics for ǫ → 0 because then one can
integrate easily the dynamics between two consecutive spin flips. Clearly when t≫ 1
the continuum time dynamics coincides with the discrete time batch dynamics (ǫ = 1).
Indeed no noticeable difference between simulations with ǫ = 1 and ǫ → 0 was found
in the typical properties of stationary states.
The comparison of the energies obtained using different methods for few values
of α in the spin glass phase is presented in fig. 3.
The estimate of the phase separation line coming from the simulations is plotted
in fig. 2. Each point was obtained from the crossing of the curves A1/N vs α for
different system sizes, as shown in the inset. There is a good agreement with the
analytical results. The static results are η independent, but simulations clearly show
that this parameter plays an important role in the dynamics.
Fig. 4 shows that retrieval states are indeed attractors in the retrieval phase.
Even when starting from initial conditions which have only a partial overlap with
pattern µ = 1, the dynamics converges to the retrieval state both for η = 0 and 1.
Actually, retrieval is enhanced when η = 0.
The inset of fig. 4 shows how the overlap A1/N depends on α, in simulations
with maximal initial overlap A1(t = 0)/N . While for large α the overlap essentially
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simulations for N=1000
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simulations for N=4000
spin glass solution
annealed calculations
Figure 3. Comparison of energy profiles obtained for g = 0.5 and η = 0.
0 0.5 1
A1(0)/N
0
0.5
1
<A
1 >
/N
10−2 10−1 100α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
<A
1 >
/N
Figure 4. Overlap A1/N in the stationary state as a function of initial overlap
at t = 0 in the retrieval phase (α = 0.05 and g = 0.1) for η = 0 ( and N) and 1
(◦ and ⊓⊔). Two system sizes (p = 64 and 128) are shown in order to appreciate
finite size effects. Inset: Overlap as a function of α for η = 0 (◦ , ∗ and ♦) and
η = 1 (+ and ×) for maximal initial overlap. The stable (solid line) and unstable
(dashed) solutions of saddle point equations are also shown.
vanishes (in the limit N → ∞) if η = 1, A1/N attains a relatively large value for
η = 0. The error bars for η = 0 indicate that the distribution of the overlap is very
broad for intermediate values of α; the overlap in a particular run can converge to any
value in the interval [0, 1− g].
Fig. 5 shows that a very different scenario takes place in the spin glass phase.
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While for η = 1 even starting from maximal overlap the dynamics converges to a spin
glass state (〈A1〉/N → 0 as 1/√N when N → ∞), for η = 0 the stationary state
preserves the initial overlap. In order to understand this behaviour it is useful to
compute the number of stationary states of the majority game as a function of the
parameters α, g and η.
0 0.5 1
A1(0)/N
0
0.5
1
<A
1 >
/N
p=256, η=1
p=512, η=1
p=256, η=0
p=512, η=0
Figure 5. Same as fig. 4 but in the spin glass phase (α = 1 and g = 0.1).
5. Number of stationary states
In order to learn more about the phase space of the majority game we calculate the
number of stationary states as a function of various parameters. The stability relation
(8) can be written in the form:
miξiA− ηξ2i > 0, mi = ±1 (12)
The average number of stationary states can be defined as:
Φ =
〈〈 ∑
{mi=±1}
N∏
i=1
Θ
(
miξiA− ηξ2i
)〉〉
, (13)
where 〈〈...〉〉 stands for the average over random patterns ξµi . This quantity is not self
averaging and diverges exponentially with N . Therefore we will calculate the annealed
entropy:
sa =
1
N
Sa =
1
N
lnΦ (14)
Since the average over the disorder is inside the logarithm (annealed
approximation) the calculations are straightforward (see [16, 17]) and lead to the
following result:
sa = max
c,cˆ,Γ,Γˆ,γ,γˆ
{
sa(c, cˆ,Γ, Γˆ, γ, γˆ)
}
(15)
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sa(c, cˆ,Γ, Γˆ, γ, γˆ) = ccˆ− αγγˆ + α2ΓΓˆ− α
2
ln
[
2Γ + (γ − 1)2]
+ ln

cosh(cˆ)− 1
2
(1− g)

e−cˆerf

2(1− g)(η − γˆ)− 2αc
2
√
2(1− g)Γˆ


+ ecˆerf

2(1− g)(η − γˆ) + 2αc
2
√
2(1− g)Γˆ



− g cosh(cˆ)erf

2(1− g)(η − γˆ)
2
√
2(1− g)Γˆ




(16)
In fig. 6 the annealed entropy is plotted as a function of g, η and α.
10−4 10−2 100 102
α
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
sa
g=0.5
η=0
η=0.5
η=0.9
η=1
10−4 10−2 100 102
α
η=0
g=0
g=0.5
g=0.7
g=0.99
g=0.9999
Figure 6. α dependence of entropy sa for various values of the parameters g and
η
For large values of α the number of stationary states increases dramatically when
η decreases from 1 to 0 . As α grows sa saturates at ln(2) for η 6= 1. This can be
understood observing that when
∣∣ξiA−i∣∣ ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ωξi +
∑
j 6=i
ξiξjmj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < (1− η)ξ2i ≃ (1− η)(1 − g)
eq. (8) is satisfied for both mi = ±1. In words, when the effective field A−i on spin
i due to the other spins mj is weak enough (i.e. its absolute value is smaller than
(1− g)(1− η)), mi can take both values. If it happens for every i all the states of the
system (expressed in terms of configuration {mi}) are stationary and thus sa = ln(2).
For large α the effective fields become small in absolute value. Indeed ξiA−i is well
approximated by a Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance 2|H0|/p ∼ 1/α.
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As a result sa → ln(2) as α → ∞. Only when η = 1 or g = 1 sa saturates to values
smaller than ln(2) (see fig. 7).
10−4 10−2 100 102 104
α
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
sa
g=0
g=0.2
g=0.4
g=0.6
g=0.8
g=0.9
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
g
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
s a
m
a
x
Figure 7. α dependence of entropy sa for η = 1 and various values of g. Inset:
Maximal entropy smax
a
as a function of g for η = 1 and α→∞.
The strong η dependence of sa displayed in the first plot in fig. 6 explains the
difference in the dynamical behaviours of the model in the spin glass phase with η = 0
and η = 1 (fig. 5). Since for η = 0 the stationary states are very dense in the phase
space, the system does not move far from the initial state before it is trapped in one
of the fixed points of the dynamics. Thus the initial overlap changes very little. In
the case η = 1 the number of stationary states is much smaller and the system goes
far away from the initial state (the initial non-zero overlap vanishes for N → ∞). It
is important to remark that the states with a non-zero overlap which are stable for
η = 0 in the spin glass phase are not attractors in the usual sense because their basin
of attraction vanishes in the thermodynamic limit.
It is easy to find sa as a function of Energy E:
sa(E) = max
c,cˆ,Γ,Γˆ,γ,γˆ,u
{
sa(c, cˆ,Γ, Γˆ, γ, γˆ) + uE +
1
2
u
α
c2
}
(17)
or overlap b.
sa(b) = max
c,cˆ,Γ,Γˆ,γ,γˆ,u
{
sa(c, cˆ,Γ, Γˆ, γ, γˆ) + ub− uc
}
(18)
The results are presented in figs. 8 and 9.
The energy dependence of sa enables us to determine the average energy of the
infinite system (see the curve on fig. 3) and explains the size of the error bars of
the simulation results. The larger error bars are due to the wider distribution of the
energy (smaller α).
The b dependence of sa deep in the retrieval phase has a different character
than in the spin glass phase (see fig. 9). The gap (region where sa(b) < 0) in the
distribution in fig. 9 disappears close to the phase boundary. We suppose that in
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Figure 8. Entropy sa(E) as a function of energy for g = 0.5, η = 0 and various
values of α
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Figure 9. Entropy sa(b) as a function of the overlap for η = 0 and various values
of g
reality the gap vanishes precisely at this boundary (compare [17]). Unfortunately due
to the inadequacy of the annealed approximation we are not in a position to draw
more quantitative conclusions.
This inadequacy of the annealed approximation used to calculate the entropy sa
is much more evident than in the case of the minority game with η = 1 [16]. One
can see it by comparing the maximal allowed value of the overlap bmax = 1 − g with
the maximal value of b for which sa(b) > 0 (fig. 9). For all g > 0 the function
sa(b) suggests the existence of stationary states with b > bmax. Also the discrepancy
between the energy profiles (fig. 3) should be attributed to the use of the annealed
approximation, which indeed overestimates the real quantities.
We tried to calculate the quenched entropy using replica method (see [18]), but
up to now we were not able to solve the arising numerical problems.
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6. Conclusions and discussion
We have shown that the stationary states of the majority game correspond to the local
minima of a Hopfield type hamiltonian and are attained when all agents “freeze”, i.e.
use always the same strategy. Stationary states are not necessarily Nash equilibria
except when agents correctly account for their impact on the aggregate (η = 1).
Depending on the parameters, the system can be in one of two phases: a retrieval
phase characterised by attractors with a macroscopic overlap A1 ∼ O(N) and a spin
glass phase with no retrieval. A macroscopic overlap can also be sustained, in the
spin glass phase, for η small. We attribute this phenomenon to the self-reinforcing
term (1 − η)ξ2i si in the dynamics which causes a dramatic increase in the number of
stationary states as η decreases. These results extend to the on-line version of the
game. Indeed the equations for the stationary states are the same and, since agents
freeze in the long run, fluctuations play no role (contrary to the case of the minority
game [6]).
These results allow us to draw some suggestions on the behaviour of systems of
interacting agents driven by conformity or by increasing returns. The occurrence of
a macroscopic overlap A1 ∼ O(N) may correspond to crowd effects such as fashions
and trends, when a large fraction of agents behave similarly in some respect, or to
economic concentration, when, for example, one particular place is arbitrarily selected
for large scale investments. The development of these crowd effects requires: i) that
the number of agents is large compared to the number of resources (α small), ii) a
sufficient differentiation between strategies of agents (g < 2/3) and iii) a large enough
initial bias (i.e. an initial macroscopic overlap) towards a particular resource, fashion
or place. Finally crowd effects can be sustained under more general conditions (i.e.
in the spin glass phase) if agents do not behave strategically, i.e. if they neglect their
impact on the aggregate (η small).
Besides the relevance of the model as a system of heterogeneous interacting agents,
it is also interesting as an example of non-Glauber dynamics in the energy landscape
of Hopfield type hamiltonians. It is remarkable that, in spite of the fact that the
dynamics of yi does not satisfy detailed balance, the statistical mechanics picture
remains quite accurate.
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